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The famous three chapters in Nelson and Winter (1982) that focus on firm 
routines and capabilities are often taken to be solidly founded on an 
assumption of bounded rationality.  I argue that, in actuality, bounded 
rationality plays a rather limited role in Nelson and Winter (1982), that the 
very different assumption of tacit knowledge is much more central, and that 
the links between bounded rationality and routines/capabilities are not clear.  
I then argue that the absence in Nelson and Winter of a clear methodological 
individualist foundation for notions such as routines, capabilities, 
competencies, etc. have resulted in certain explanatory difficulties in the 
modern organizational capabilities approach that has taken so much 
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I. Introduction 
This paper discusses the respective explanatory roles of bounded rationality and tacit 
knowledge in the organizational capabilities approach, an increasingly influential 
approach to the theory of the firm that owes very much to Nelson and Winter’s 
seminal volume, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982).  As befits a 
contribution to a special issue in honor of Nelson and Winter, particular attention is 
devoted to their much-cited treatment in chapters 3 to 5 in that book of bounded 
rationality and tacit knowledge in the context of firm organization and behavior ⎯ a 
treatment that Selten (1990: 649) characterized as having “… brought new impulses to 
the modeling of boundedly rational behavior in economics.”  However, the 
examination of their treatment is not just undertaken for its sake, but also because the 
Nelson and Winter approach to conceptualizing the firm and understanding its 
organization and behavior has been extremely influential for writers within the 
organizational capabilities approach (an umbrella term covering capabilities, dynamic 
capabilities, and competence approaches as well as the evolutionary theory of the 
firm) (see also Pierce, Boerner and Teece 2002).  The organizational capabilities 
approach is quite often seen as an approach to the theory of the firm that puts much 
more of an emphasis on bounded rationality than is the case in, notably, transaction 
cost economics (e.g., Fransman 1994; Conner and Prahalad 1996; Marengo et al. 2000).  
It is also seen as one that goes beyond information-processing and stresses the tacit 
and socially embedded aspects of knowledge (Fransman 1994).  Both of these 
characteristics hark directly back to Nelson and Winter.    
 In this paper I engage critically with this influential view.  Specifically, the 
following points are developed.  First, the argument is made that the theory of firm 
developed in Nelson and Winter (1982) is considerably less about bounded rationality 
than it is about socially held tacit knowledge. Bounded rationality and tacit 
knowledge do not logically imply each other.  It may, in fact, be argued that Simonian 
bounded rationality and Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge are ultimately founded 
on very different, and perhaps incompatible epistemologies (see Nightingale 2002).  
Attempts to combine the two are likely to be unsuccessful, one driving out the other.  
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This is largely the case in Nelson and Winter (1982), in which tacit knowledge looms 
much larger than bounded rationality. The tip of balance in favor of tacit knowledge 
has become even more pronounced in subsequent work within the organizational 
capabilities approach.  Second, the emphasis on socially held knowledge in the form of 
“routines” and the downplaying of bounded rationality in Nelson and Winter (1982) 
mean that there is very little attention to the level of individual agent.  Indeed, the 
Nelson and Winter theory (as well as many subsequent contributions to the 
organizational capabilities approach) may be criticized for not being consistent with 
methodological individualism, at least in the sense that it works with aggregate 
entities (i.e., routines and capabilities) that are not explicitly reduced to individual 
behavior.  Third, I argue that the absence of a clear behavioral foundation for the 
organizational capabilities approach is the root cause of the difficulties that the 
organizational capabilities approach has with respect to illuminating the key 
organizational economics issues of the internal organization and boundaries of the 
firm.  
II.  Nelson and Winter (1982): a High Point in the Evolution of 
the Organizational Capabilities Approach 
Briefly on the Organizational Capabilities Approach 
 What I here call the “organizational capabilities approach” gets its name after 
chapter five in Nelson and Winter (1982) (cf. also Dosi, Nelson and Winter 2000).  
Nelson and Winter (1982) has arguably appealed more to business administration 
and management (particularly strategy) scholars than to economists.1 One paper after 
another, in such fields as strategy, organizational learning, international business, and 
organizational behavior, have generously cited the book, particularly the three 
chapters (3 to 5) that deal with issues pertaining to individual and organizational 
behavior and capabilities.  This is not surprising: Re-reading the chapters makes one 
realize that perhaps not so much essential has happened in two succeeding decades of 
work on capabilities, competence, evolutionary, etc. theories of the firm that goes 
                                                          
1 See the citation analysis in Meyer (2001). 
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beyond Nelson and Winter’s treatment.   It is arguable that later ideas on competence 
traps, the central importance of tacit and socially complex “resources” for explaining 
competitive advantage, knowledge replication, and dynamic capabilities can be 
found in at least an embryonic, and often quite explicit, form in Nelson and Winter 
(1982). 
 Quite appropriately, contributors to the organizational capabilities approach 
have therefore often treated Nelson and Winter (1982) not only as a source of 
inspiration, but also as a foundation.  At first sight this may appear somewhat 
surprising, given that building a distinct theory of the firm was never the intention of 
Nelson and Winter (1982).2 However, what may appeal to writers within the 
organizational capabilities approach is the attempt in that book to treat in a unified 
fashion bounded rationality and tacit knowledge, and at the same time place these in 
a social context ⎯ all of which converges in a single, highly intuitively plausible 
concept, namely that of “routine.” These ideas, as well the use of them to help 
explaining revealed competitive advantages, innovation and limited aspects of 
economic organization, cannot really be found in any other of the precursors of the 
capabilities approach.  Thus, what unites recent capabilities (Richardson 1972; 
Chandler 1992; Langlois 1992), dynamic capabilities (Teece and Pisano 1994), 
competence approaches (Sanchez 2001), the knowledge-based view of the firm 
(Fransman 1994; Grant 1996), and, of course, the “evolutionary theory of the firm” 
(e.g., Marengo et al. 2000; Dosi 2000) is indeed an emphasis on the central explanatory 
importance of experiential, localized, socially constructed and embedded knowledge 
and learning in understanding firm organization and behavior.   
 As Langlois and Foss (1999) point out, these approaches are also united in their 
attempt to increasingly go beyond their traditional explananda of explaining the 
sources of competitive advantage, localized innovative activity, and general rigidity 
of firm behavior to also include issues, notably the boundaries and internal 
organization of the firm, that have traditionally been considered the turf of the more 
                                                          
2 At the Academy of Management Meetings in Toronto, August 2000, Sidney Winter, in a major 
address, insisted that there is no theory of the firm in Nelson and Winter (1982).  Presumably, what he 
meant is that there is no theory of the firm in the sense of explaining the existence and boundaries of 
the firm.   
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mainstream economics of organization.  At the heart of these stories are the 
characteristics, notably tacitness, of the knowledge that is embedded in 
organizational capabilities (Kogut and Zander 1992; Langlois 1992).  Some (vaguely 
specified) mechanism is supposed to link these characteristics to the boundaries of the 
firm as well as to aspects of internal organization.     
 It is quite common to interpret this literature as an attempt to provide more 
room for bounded rationality than is standard fare in the economics of organization 
(e.g., Conner and Prahalad 1996; Fransman 1994).  However, it is seldom made clear 
in exactly what sense the organizational capabilities literature may be characterized 
as starting from bounded rationality.  Because bounded rationality is, unfortunately, 
a concept that comes with an legacy of diverse and even conflicting interpretations, it 
does matter where exactly one starts from, and it is rather uninformative to say that 
the organizational capabilities approach builds on bounded rationality, unless one 
specifies what kind of bounded rationality.  Thus, are we talking about Newell and 
Simon’s work on heuristic search, or Selten’s aspiration adaptation theory, or Lipman 
or Rubinstein’s axiomatic foundations for bounded rationality, or regularities 
established in experimental psychological research, or another one of the great 
number of different ⎯ indeed, very different ⎯ variations on Simon’s Grand Theme?   
 However, such information is virtually never forthcoming. Indeed, it is easy to 
become skeptical about the real role played by bounded rationality in the 
organizational capabilities approach for the basic reason that out of the many sources 
that the approach builds on, notably the works of Philip Selznick, Alfred Chandler, 
Edith Penrose, G.B. Richardson and Nelson and Winter (1982) (see Foss 1997 for a 
sampling), only Nelson and Winter explicitly address and try to incorporate bounded 
rationality.3 All this raises suspicions that talk of bounded rationality in connection 
with the capabilities approach may in actuality be more rhetorical (in the pre-
McCloskeyan, derogatory sense) than substantive.  Understanding the extent to 
                                                          
3  It may be argued that behavioralist organization theory (notably March and Simon 1958 and Cyert 
and March 1963) is also a key input into the development of the approach (Pierce, Boerner, and Teece 
2002 present such a reading).  However, this is quite unusual, and not everybody would agree.  For 
example, Fransman (1994) argues that behavioralism is taken up with information-processing whereas 
the real concern in the organizational capabilities approach is the use and growth of knowledge.  The 
present paper leads to support Fransman’s rather than Pierce, Boerner and Teece’s position.  
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which the organizational capabilities approach builds on a foundation consisting of 
bounded rationality requires that we take a look at Nelson and Winter, precisely 
because this contribution has been hugely influential with respect to the 
conceptualization of business firms as well the understanding of their organization 
and behavior.  
Nelson and Winter on Skills, Routines, and Organizational Behavior 
 Quite early in Nelson and Winter (1982), namely when discussing “the need for 
an evolutionary theory,” the authors observe that their “… basic critique of orthodoxy 
is connected with the bounded rationality problem” (p.36), and that, therefore, they 
“… accept and absorb into our analysis many of the ideas of the behavioral theorists” 
(p.35-36), notably Cyert, March and Simon.  In particular, they are attracted to the 
behavioralist notion that short and medium run firm behavior is determined by 
relatively simple decision rules (Cyert and March 1963).4  They also make use of 
behavioralist models of satisficing search (Simon 1955).  In a later contribution they 
note that “[t]he view of firm behavior built into evolutionary economic theory fits 
well with the theory of firms contained in modern organization theory, especially the 
part that shares our own debt to the ‘Carnegie School’ (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert 
and March, 1992)” (2002: 42).  However, in the 1982 book Nelson and Winter go 
significantly beyond behavioralism by examining populations of firms with differing 
decision rules, by addressing the interplay between changing external environments 
and changing decision rules (see also Pierce, Boerner and Teece 2002), and, the most 
interesting theoretical innovation in the context of this paper, by trying to bring 
bounded rationality together with tacit knowledge.  It is the last aspect of Nelson and 
Winter’s “updating exercise” that I shall argue is not entirely successful.  
 Nelson and Winter’s main problem with “orthodox” theory, and particularly the 
neoclassical theory of the firm, does not appear to be that this theory rules out 
diversity in terms of productive or organizational capabilities between firms in an 
industry per se (as some contributors to the organizational capabilities approach have 
                                                          
4  Winter (1964b) wrote an early and favorable review of Cyert and March (1963).  In a later paper 
(Winter 1986), he was quite explicit about the behavioral nature of the theory in Nelson and Winter 
(1982).   However, behavioralism is only one among a large set of inspirations and precursors.   
 5
argued, e.g., Conner 1991).  Indeed, that theory does allow for variety in these 
dimensions.  For example, to the extent that differences in how well (“competently”) 
a firm is run reflects owners’ on the job consumption, and these owners are able and 
willing to bear the consequences of this consumption (Demsetz 1997), the neoclassical 
theory of the firm allows for differential competencies to exist in equilibrium.  One 
may also simply postulate differential initial endowments of some costly-to-copy 
resources, so that firms with differential efficiencies may exist in equilibrium.  
However, the main point of Nelson and Winter’s critique is that in mainstream 
economics, heterogeneity is at best exogeneously determined (as in the cases of 
differing preferences for on the job consumption or different initial endowments).  To 
paraphrase their argument, in the setting of the (basic) neoclassical theory of the firm, 
it has to be in this way, because the production set is assumed to be not only given (or 
at best changing through given technological progress functions or similar 
constructs), but also to be fully transparent.  The implication, as Demsetz (1991) notes, 
is that if information costs are thus assumed to be zero, what one firm can do on the 
level of production, another firm can do equally well.    
 Unlike Demsetz, Nelson and Winter do not cast their argument in terms of the 
information (and other) costs of copying rival firms’ resource endowments.  Instead, 
they devote a whole chapter (4) to an analysis of skills. By a skill, they mean “… a 
capability for a smooth sequence of coordinated behavior that is ordinarily effective 
relative to its objectives, given the context in which it normally occurs” (1982: 73). The 
attractions of the notion of skill are apparent.  First, it provides a way of introducing 
dynamics on the level of production, since skills need to be nurtured and tend to 
grow with practice.  Second, it provides an analogy to the behavioralist notion that 
behavior is strongly guided by relatively rigid decision rules, and thus serves to 
underscore Nelson and Winter’s critique of maximization in the sense of forward-
looking, informed deliberate choice. They put much emphasis on this, noting that  
“…the sort of choice that takes place in the process of exercising a skill is choice 
without deliberation” (p. 82), although they are careful to note that the behavioral 
“programs” embodied in skills may be initiated through deliberate, but presumably 
boundedly rational, choice.  However, this and the notion that routines may be 
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changed through meta-routines (i.e., search routines) is the only substantive 
connection that the notion of bounded rationality make to skills and the organization-
level counterpart to individual skills, namely routines.  Neither concept is directly 
derived from from bounded rationality considerations.  Third, starting from skills and 
developing the organization-level analogy to skills allow Nelson and Winter to bring 
considerations of tacit knowledge into the picture and to develop a strong critique of 
the “blueprint” view of neoclassical production function theory.  Fourth, it helps them 
to establish a link between individual action and organizational behavior.  That link is 
initiated in a rather straightforward way by the observation that “… directly relevant 
to our development here is the value of individual behavior as a metaphor for 
organizational behavior” (1982: 72; emphasis in original).   
 In turn, “organizational behavior” is addressed in terms of “routines” that serve 
as organization-level metaphorical equivalents to individual skills.  Note in passing 
that this is not an idea that originates with Nelson and Winter (1982).  Thus, Simon 
(1947) argued that habit may be understood in terms of limits to attention5; in turn, 
habit has an organization-level counterpart, namely organizational routines.  Like 
skills, routines represent stable sequences of actions (i.e., they coordinate actions) that 
are triggered by certain stimuli in certain contexts and which, in a sense, serve as 
memories for the organizations that embody them.  However, because routines are 
social phenomena, they go beyond the skill metaphor and raise issues of motivation 
and coordination.  However, Nelson and Winter sidestep the motivation issue, 
arguing that routines represent “organizational truces,” an idea going back to Cyert 
and March (1963).  
 Thus, quite a lot ⎯ and perhaps too much  ⎯ is packed into the notion of 
routine, including a variety of behaviors (e.g., heuristics and strategies), 
organizational processes and arrangements, cognitive issues (e.g., “organizational 
memories”), and incentives (“truces”).6  Nelson and Winter defend this by noting 
                                                          
5 Nelson and Winter (1982: 85) are hinting at a similar idea when they observe that “… there is in a 
sense a tradeoff between capability and deliberate choice, a choice imposed ultimately by the fact that 
rationality is bounded.”  This attempt to explain skills in terms of attention allocation is, however, not 
extended to the level of routines.  
6  See also Winter (1986: 165) for a sophisticated further discussion and defence of this. 
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that, in actuality, “… skills, organization, and ‘technology’ are intimately intertwined 
in a functioning routine, and it is difficult to say where one aspect ends and another 
begins” (1982: 104).  Although it is true that the boundaries are blurred, it is not clear 
why one is not excused, for purposes of analytical clarity, to look at one aspect at a 
time.  It is one thing to claim that ontologically, things are a mess.  It is another thing 
to openly admit the mess into analysis.  This is perhaps only a minor problem for 
Nelson and Winter: Because their level of analysis lies higher than the firm, they can 
afford to keep the firm level messy.  However, their all-inclusive notion of routine 
may have contributed to the considerable terminological soup that characterizes the 
organizational capabilities approach as well as the difficulties of giving precise 
content to the notion of routines (cf. Cohen et al. 1996), and derived and related 
notions, such as capabilities, competencies, etc.  In the following, another possible 
source of conceptual and explanatory problems in the organizational capabilities 
approach is considered, namely the absence of a clear foundation, rooted in 
individual, boundedly rational choice behavior, for the notion of routines.  
III. A Closer Look on Bounded Rationality and Tacit Knowledge 
in the Organizational Capabilities Approach 
At first glance, bounded rationality appears to be quite crucial to Nelson and Winter’s 
argument (Fransman 1994).  Thus, firm members can only learn routines through 
practicing them; routines are simply repeated until they become too dysfunctional; 
learning is myopic, search is satisficing; etc.  All of these very strong assumptions 
about individual and organizational behavior would seem to make room for a 
rationality that is very bounded indeed.  Apparently, this is Williamson’s impression 
when he argues that Nelson and Winter work with a version of bounded rationality, 
“organic rationality,” that assumes less intentionality, foresight and calculativeness 
than his own notion of bounded rationality (Williamson 1985: ).  However, 
(re)reading chapters 3 to 5 in Nelson and Winter suggests that what ultimately 
interests them is not really bounded rationality per se in the sense of a commitment to 
building specific models of boundedly rational individual behavior that, in turn, may 
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be fed into models of organization level behavior and outcomes.  What interest them 
is rather tacit knowledge and its embodiment in their firm-level analogy to individual 
skills, namely routines, and how these notions assists the understanding of sluggish 
organizational change and adaptation. These claims are substantiated in the 
following.    
The Limited Role of Bounded Rationality in Nelson and Winter  
 Bounded rationality has a bad reputation for being used as a sort of catch-all 
category that can “explain” all observed deviations from maximizing rationality 
(Conlisk 1996; Casson and Wadeson 1997).  The Simon dictum that man is 
“intendedly rationality, but only limitedly so” is an example. In itself it is vacuous 
and therefore explains or predicts virtually nothing.   Explanation and prediction that 
begins from a foundation of bounded rationality requires that bounded rationality be 
focused through specific models of behavior (such as Simon 1955).   This is where the 
link to the skill metaphor of organizational behavior becomes important, for it is the 
use of the notion of skill and particularly its transfer to the organizational level that 
step in and fill the explanatory and predictive vacuum left by invoking bounded 
rationality in general terms.  In other words, it is skills and, particularly, routines that 
allow Nelson and Winter (1982) to work out an explanatory and predictive theory of 
firm behavior.  However, the additional assumptions that are added to the basic 
invocation of bounded rationality are not drawn from the existing evidence, notably 
from psychology, on boundedly rational behavior per se, although Nelson and Winter 
(2002: 31) in a later paper argue that “[I]n contrast to the usual quest for 
microfoundations in economics, seeking consistency with rationality assumptions, 
our quest is for consistency with the available evidence on learning and behavior at 
both the individual and organizational levels.”   
 In fact, it turns out that what they mean by the “available evidence” may be 
somewhat idiosyncratic. They go on to argue, in the 2002 paper, that “[w]ith respect 
to individual learning, the plausibility of our behavioral foundations for evolutionary 
economics has received support from an unexpected quarter.  Studies linking 
cognitive abilities and brain physiology have established the existence of 
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anatomically distinct memory processes supporting the skilled behaviors of 
individuals” (Nelson and Winter 2002: 33).7  Not only is such memory “highly 
durable,” it also “… functions in some ways that are alien to theories of calculative 
rationality” (p.34).  While this cognitive science support for the notion of skilled 
behavior seems compelling, the evidence they present in support for the critical move 
from individual skilled behavior to the organizational, routine level is less so.  The 
only cited evidence is an experimental study of card-playing teams (Cohen and 
Bacdayan 1994) that demonstrated that team level skills (i.e. “routines”) aquired 
under one specification of the played game made the adaptation to a new 
specification of the game sluggish.   While this has much with skilled and inertial 
behavior and problems of adaptability on the level of teams, it is not clear what 
exactly all this has to do with bounded rationality.   Thus, Nelson and Winter’s (2002) 
recent stocktaking reinforces the tendency in Nelson and Winter (1982) to lump 
together an almost empty characterization of bounded rationality with a much richer 
description of skilled behavior.  Bounded rationality is, in effect, suppressed as a 
result of this exercise.  This raises the question of why bounded rationality is treated 
as a background assumption while individual and organizational level skilled 
behavior takes precedence. 
Why Tacit Knowledge is More Important than Bounded Rationality in Nelson and 
Winter  
 Nelson and Winter (1982) explicitly compare skilled behavior to the execution of 
a computer program.8  The outcomes of computer programs are predictable, given 
knowledge of what is fed into them and knowledge of the program itself.  When 
triggered in a certain context, skilled behavior is also predictable, and knowledge of 
an individual’s skill set, the relevant context, and the relevant stimulus may also 
allow for reasonably accurate prediction of his behavior. Per implication, if 
                                                          
7 No references are given, but presumably they have in mind the kind of work described in Damasio 
(1994).    
8 Winter’s background at RAND may have played a role here: It was a commonly held view at RAND 
that the computer is a “scale free” model of organization.  If both organizations and skills can be 
characterized in terms of computer programs, the metaphorical jump from skills to the organization-
level of routines seems tempting to make – and may actually be more than merely metaphorical.  
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organizational routines, the organization-level counterpart to individual skills, also 
may be understood as programs that make aggregate (i.e., organization-level) 
behavior predictable and inert.  And it is inert organizational behavior that Nelson 
and Winter (1982) are after, because this is a necessary part of their evolutionary 
mode of explanation.  Thus, tacit knowledge, as embodied in skills and routines, can 
do the job.9 Can bounded rationality do the job, that is, can it explain inert 
organizational behavior?    
 In Nelson and Winter, bounded rationality is mainly treated to the extent that it 
provides an underpinning for the behavioralist notion of decision rules, particularly 
in connection with search. Such decision rules may be understood as manifestations 
of bounded rationality, on the individual level (cf. Simon 1955) and, less obviously, 
on the organizational level (Cyert and March 1963).  One may expect rule-bound 
behavior to also provide a strong explanation of inert organizational behavior.  
However, there are two reasons why bounded rationality and the decision rules it 
gives to may not be a strong foundation for a theory of organizational inertia.  First, 
decision rules that are explicit (i.e., Cyert and March’s 1963 “standard operating 
procedures”) may arguably be changed at lower cost than complex routines that 
embody huge amounts of tacit knowledge.  In this sense, routines that are 
rationalized in terms of skills and tacit knowledge offer a stronger explanation of 
organizational sluggishness than standard operating procedures.  Tacit’ness beats 
bounded rationality with respect to the explanation of inertia, as it were.  Second, it is 
far from clear that individual bounded rationality produces inert behavior on the 
aggregate level.  To be sure, such stories can be told (e.g., Heath, Knez and Camerer 
1993; Egidi 2001), but they require that bounded rationality and the interaction 
between boundedly rational agents be specified in certain ways.  To take an almost 
trivial example, if similar agents all suffer from status quo-biases, their aggregate 
behavior may indeed manifest inertia.  In contrast, it is not clear that inert aggregate 
                                                          
9 In fact, tacit knowledge can do the job so well that it is not clear that Nelson and Winter even need 
bounded rationality for the purpose of understanding such adaptation.  For example, if organizational 
members do not hold the same tacit knowledge, this may be sufficient to explain sluggishness, because 
of costly communication. 
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behavior will in general follow from individual level rule-following, for example, in 
the form of some satisificing model.  
  Thus, bounded rationality alone cannot do what Nelson and Winter wish their 
behavioral assumptions for them; hence, the invocation of skills, and the use of the 
skill metaphor to address aggregate behavior.  In the end, bounded rationality is 
more a sort of background argument that ⎯ inspiring other assumptions about tacit 
knowledge and skilled human behavior ⎯ serves to make plausible the notion of 
organizational routine (including search routines), and therefore the sluggish 
organizational adaptation that is crucial in Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary story.10  
Thus, the whole construct works from an initial argument about bounded rationality, 
goes from there to behavioralist decision rules, jumps via analogy to ideas on tacit 
knowledge as embodied in skilled behavior, and then transfers skills to the level of 
routines and organizational capabilities. Bounded rationality re-enters the story when 
changes in routines and capabilities have to be explained, namely in the form of 
dynamic search routines.    
 This is a complicated exercise that has some unfortunate consequences.  In 
addition to the various problems identified in the Cohen et al. (1996) symposium on 
the meaning of routines, there are at least two further problematic consequences of 
this exercise.  First, tacit knowledge and bounded rationality tend to become 
indiscriminately lumped together, because it is not transparent where the one ends 
and the other begins. Of course, tacit knowledge and bounded rationality are 
different things and do not necessarily imply each other.  Thus, there can be tacit 
rules for maximization, as Machlup (1946) argued.  Or, agents can cope with bounded 
rationality by means of fully explicit operating procedures.   While one can certainly 
construct an argument that boundedly rational agents make use of experientially 
                                                          
10 Moreover, those who are not committed to behavioralism may point out that even if one wishes to 
keep organizational routines central, it is not so obvious how essential bounded rationality really is. 
This may be argued in a number of ways.  One can have perfectly rational standard operating 
procedures.  It is possible to tell a story in which different routines in a population of firms emerge as 
solutions to appropriately specified games being played in each firms and with agents acting in a 
maximizing manner. Search behavior is easily reconciled with maximization. It is perfectly possible to 
tell sophisticated maximization stories about agents following rigid routines and procedures, once a 
full account is made of all relevant costs (e.g., costs of memorizing, depositing, retrieving, etc. 
information) (Casson and Wadeson 1997; Foss and Foss 2000).  
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produced ⎯ and “skilled” ⎯ decision rules that are likely to embody a good deal of 
tacit knowledge (Langlois 1999), there is no necessary connection between bounded 
rationality and tacit knowledge.  Second, and perhaps more seriously, bounded 
rationality on the level of the individual becomes suppressed.  This makes it hard to 
understand the link between bounded rationality on the one hand and routines and 
other organizational phenomena on the other.  In other words, what exactly is the 
nature of the mechanism that aggregates from individual behavior to routines and 
organizational behavior? This mechanism is never really identified in Nelson and 
Winter (1982).11 It also means that there is a certain interpretative ambiguity 
surrounding the notion of routines to the extent that it is related to bounded 
rationality: Is organization-level routinization produced by interaction effects among 
the members of a team or is it ultimately founded in aspects of individual cognition 
(Egidi 2000: 2).  These issues are not resolved in Nelson and Winter (1982).  In 
fairness, it should be noted that this is perhaps not surprising, since rather little work 
existed on this issue when Nelson and Winter wrote their book.   
The Organizational Capabilities Approach and Economic Organization 
 As mentioned earlier, Nelson and Winter (1982) is a high point in the 
development of the organizational capabilities approach, and their work has been 
foundational for much subsequent work within this approach.  It has also been 
mentioned that the modern organizational capabilities approach aspires to being a 
theory of economic organization, a point where it goes beyond Nelson and Winter 
(1982).  The argument that will be briefly developed here is that certain characteristics 
of Nelson and Winter (1982) were carried over into the organizational capabilities 
approach, characteristics that may not be so problematic if the analytical purpose is 
one of explaining rigidity in firm behavior as a part of a broader evolutionary story, 
but which are much less appropriate for the purpose of building a theory of economic 
organization.12 The relevant characteristics are a strong emphasis on aggregate 
                                                          
11 Later work in the evolutionary economics is less vulnerable to this critique, notably the work of Egidi 
(e.g., 2000), Marengo et al, (2000), Warglien (e.g., 1995), and Dosi, Marengo, and Fagiolo (1996). 
12 Foss (1996) discusses other problems with organizational capabilities theories as theories of economic 
organization. 
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entities, notably routines and organizational capabilities, an emphasis that comes at 
the expense of attention to individual behaviors, and derives from Nelson and 
Winter’s attempt to establish a metaphorical solution to the aggregation problem of 
moving from the level of the agent to the level of the organization.13  Because they 
fully recognize the metaphorical character of this maneuver, they do not commit the 
mistake of conflating an ontological claim with a useful research heuristic. Later 
contributors to the organizational capabilities approach may not have been as careful 
here as Nelson and Winter.  
 Problems seem to emerge rather unavoidably as soon as Nelson and Winter’s 
ideas on organizational routines and capabilities are transferred from their original 
place in the analysis of a changing population of firms to an analysis of the behavior 
and, particularly, organization of individual firms.  While these notions have indeed 
been of value for the understanding of, for example, the sources of competitive 
advantage (although much of this literature is also plagued by conceptual ambiguity), 
their application to economic organization is more problematic.  For example, the 
much cited Kogut and Zander (1992) paper essentially argues directly from the tacit 
knowledge embodied in organizational capabilities to the boundaries of the firm.  The 
supporting argument is that “firms know more than their contracts can tell”.  
However, there is no attempt to address this is in terms of comparative contracting, 
and, ultimately, individual behavior.   What exactly is it that cannot be written in 
contracts?  Even if writing costs in fact are prohibitive, why cannot relational 
contracting, involving highly incomplete contracts, between independent parties 
handle the transfer of knowledge?  Why is it only vertical integration that economizes 
with what are presumably writing and communication costs?  No compelling 
answers are given to such questions.  This is the case of most of this literature as it 
applied to economic organization.  A partial exception is the work of Langlois (1992).  
Langlois attempts to supply the missing mechanism from organizational capabilities 
to the boundaries of the firm by means of the concept of ”dynamic transaction costs,” 
                                                          
13 A doctrinal history corollary to this argument is that Nelson and Winter’s theory of the firm 
capabilities and behavior is more in line with the thinking of Thorstein Veblen and prehaps Friedrich 
Hayek than wit the behavioralist tradition that they see as among the most important precursors of 
their work.   On Veblen as a precursor of the organizational capabilities approach, see Foss (1998). 
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which are essentially communication costs that arise because of ”dis-similar” 
(Richardson 1972) capabilities in a vertical structure of firms. Presumably efficient 
economic organization minimizes such costs (as well as other more ”traditional” 
transaction costs, allowance being made for possible tradeoffs between these).  
 However, this idea may imply another difficulty, one that is also present in 
Nelson and Winter (1982) and in virtually all of the organizational capabilities 
literature. This difficulty is that knowledge inside firms is assumed be homogenous 
(or less strongly: Not very costly to communicate), while knowledge between firms 
(“differential capabilities”) is taken to be (very) heterogeneous (and therefore costly to 
communicate).   Thus, Winter (1986: 175) assumes that “… the search for information 
from external sources does not proceed with the same ease as for internal sources.”  If 
this were not the case, it is hard to see how communication costs could carry 
implications for the boundaries of the firm.  However, although there may be some 
intuitive appeal to the assumption, it is hard to accept as true in general.  There are 
many examples of firms where the bandwidth of the communication channels 
between some business unit of the firm and external firm (e.g., buyer or seller) is 
much higher than the bandwidth between the unit and, say, corporate headquarters.  
Moreover, the implicit assumption that knowledge in hierarchies can be taken, at 
least as a first approximation, to be communicable at zero cost makes it hard to 
understand hierarchical organization, since with zero cost communication the 
managerial task has no economic rationale (Demsetz 1991; Casson 1994). 
Methodological Individualism 
 It seems fairly obvious that the essentially ad hoc assumptions that knowledge 
inside firms can be communicated at low costs while knowledge between firms can 
only be communicated at high cost slip into the analysis when the units of analysis 
are routines or organizational capabilities.  It is then easy to postulate that “firms 
know more than their contracts can tell” and that all organizational aspects are 
“intertwined in a functioning routine.” If instead the analysis had started in an 
explicit methodological individualist mode, that is, from individual choice behavior, 
the argument that communication costs within, for example, certain business units 
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may be lower than the communication costs between people in the unit and people in 
a supplier firm, might have been derived as an outcome of a properly specified model 
instead of being postulated.14  The problem is that there is no theory of individual 
choice behavior in the organizational capabilities approach, so that writers in the 
organizational capabilities approach have to treat economic organization in a 
methodological collectivist way, namely in terms of postulating somewhat crude 
causal relations between capabilities and economic organization, little attention being 
paid to the microanalytic issues involved. Not surprisingly, these stories are 
vulnerable to basic critiques from the perspective of comparative contracting (Foss 
1996; Williamson 2000).  
 Ironically, it turns out that much of the organizational capabilities approach is 
vulnerable to the same critique that Winter (1991) forcefully (and justifiably) launched 
against the neoclassical theory of the firm.  Specifically, and borrowing directly from 
Winter, it is in potential “conflict with methodological individualism” (p.181) 
(because of the emphasis on routines and organizational capabilities), “… provides no 
basis for explaining economic organization” (p.183) (because transaction costs and 
comparative contracting are not considered), lacks “realism” (because of its 
“unrealistic” treatment of decision-making as entirely guided by routines), and 
provides a “simplistic treatment of its  focal concern” (e.g., because it is simply 
assumed that it is easier to gather, combine, source, etc. knowledge inside firms than 
between firms).   The main underlying problem, it has been argued here, is that too 
little attention is devoted to individual decision-making.   The problem goes at least 
partly back to Nelson and Winter: It is arguable that their side-stepping of bounded  
rationality on the level of the individual agent in favor of aggregate notions (i.e., 
routines and capabilities) is an important source of some of the explanatory 
difficulties that the modern capabilities approach confront.  
 IV. Concluding Comments 
                                                          
14 For what I have in mind here, see, for example, Barr and Saraceno (2002) and Zandt (1999). 
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In conclusion it appropriate to cast the argument in this paper in a somewhat broader 
context.   In a fine paper, Paul Nightingale (2002) has made an argument that is 
parallel to the one that has been developed.  Nightingale (2002: 1) argues that Nelson 
and Winter (1982) seek to “… bring together two very different ways of thinking 
about knowledge,” namely the more appreciative “… tacit knowledge tradition that 
derives, in part, from Polanyi’s phenomenology” and the more formal “… objectivist 
information processing, problem-solving approach that derives, in part, from Simon.” 
This is visible in their attempt to conceptualize firms both in terms of information 
processing and in terms of tacit and socially embedded knowledge.  Nightingale 
argues that a number of tensions in the science and technology policy literature are 
traceable to this problematic attempt in Nelson and Winter to fuse two 
epistemologies, the tensions between which are what has fuelled other recent debates, 
notably in artificial intelligence research. 
 Much of the argument in this paper may be cast in similar terms: The attempt in 
Nelson and Winter to combine ideas on routines and skilled behavior that are derived 
from Polanyi with ideas on bounded rationality and satisficing search that are 
derived from Simon has not been entirely satisfactory, and may be an important 
source of some of the explanatory difficulties that confront the modern organizational 
capabilities approach.  An indication that Nelson and Winter’s reconciliation exercise 
was not entirely successful is that tacit knowledge and bounded rationality simply 
are not equal partners in the 1982 book; the three central chapters on firm 
organization behavior and organization are to a much larger extent about tacit 
knowledge than about bounded rationality.  Thus, contrary to a commonly held view, 
the role of bounded rationality in the organizational capabilities approach is very 
much a background one.15  Its precise relation, if any, to the notion of the central 
concepts of routine and capability is unclear. Its role seems more rhetorical than 
substantive.  At any rate, boundedly rational behavior on the level of the individual 
agent is not modeled, neither in Nelson and Winter’s seminal 1982 book, nor in the 
                                                          
15 For the parallel argument that the role of bounded rationality in the modern economics of 
organization (notably transaction cost economics) is also a background one, see Foss (2001). 
 17
many contributions to the organizational capabilities approach that are so heavily 
indebted to this contribution.  
 Finally, lest this paper be taken as a general attack on the organizational 
capabilities approach, it is important to stress that its real message is a methodogical 
one: Writers in the organizational capabilities tradition should devote more analytical 
energies to getting the microfoundations right.  It will not do in the long run to 
continue working with concepts whose microfoundations are unclear.  This is not just 
a matter of conforming to the conventional methodological individualist approach of 
most of economics.  It is also, and more substantively, a matter of the explanatory and 
predictive capabilities of the organizational capabilities approach being less 
impressive than they could be as a result of the lack of microfoundations for concepts 
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